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Abstract
In their commentary on my paper Phillips and Goodman suggested that counterfactual causality and
considerations on causality like those by Bradford Hill are only "guideposts on the road to common
sense". I argue that if common sense is understood to mean views that the vast majority of
researchers share, Hill's considerations did not lead to common sense in the past – precisely
because they are so controversial. If common sense is taken to mean beliefs that are true, then
Hill's considerations can only lead to common sense in the simple and well-understood causal
systems they apply to. Counterfactuals, however, are largely common sense in the latter meaning.
I suggest that the road of scientific endeavour should lead epidemiologic research toward sound
strategies that equip researchers with skills to separate causal from non-causal associations with
minimal error probabilities. This is undeniably the right direction and the one counterfactual
causality leads to. Hill's considerations are merely heuristics with which epidemiologists may or
may not find this direction, and they are likely to fail in complex landscapes (causal systems). In such
environments, one might easily lose orientation without further aids (e.g., defendable assumptions
on biases). Counterfactual causality tells us when and how to apply these heuristics.
Background
Scientific endeavour is stimulated by researchers who not
only communicate their ideas but also reflect upon them
in light of the arguments of others. Different scientists
have varying perspectives because of, for example, their
differing areas of expertise and biographies. Varying
points of view may add arguments to the debate that the
originator of an idea had not initially been aware of. In
this regard, I highly appreciate the thoughtful comments
of Phillips and Goodman [1] on my paper [2] on Hill's [3]
considerations on causality, and I am grateful for the
opportunity to respond to them. Now, let us see how my
ideas persist when pondered alongside Phillips and
Goodman's arguments.
Analysis
Coming to terms with the terms
It seems that Phillips and Goodman largely agree with me
that there are no such things as "causal criteria" (temporal
precedence of the factor to the outcome perhaps being the
exception). They would, however, be better off not to use
that term except to indicate how misleading it is. Phillips
and Goodman also agree with me about the usefulness of
counterfactuals although they are not fully consistent in
their argumentation (on page 4f. they write that "...most
everyone who uses causal language is implicitly invoking
the counterfactual definition...We cannot think of any use
of the word 'cause' in epidemiology ... where the author
seemed to have something else in mind.". On page 3,
however, they assert: "...counterfactuals are, more than
anything else, guideposts on the road to common sense").
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We seem, therefore, to disagree in our views on the rela-
tion between "causal criteria" and counterfactuals, and I
shall explain how our views differ using the same "road"
metaphor that Phillips and Goodman invoke.
Causal definitions, conceptions or models have many
roots, for instance, in different scientific disciplines. (I
have no preference in using one term over another, and I
do not believe that the debate on these terms leads us any-
where). Causal thinking is like a road system of scientific
endeavour the intent of which should be to lead scientists
from different disciplines throughout the centuries
toward the same arrival point, namely, to sound strategies
through which to derive the right causal answers in empir-
ical research. Phillips and Goodman consider "common
sense" to be the arrival point. This is unfortunate because
"common sense" has two very different meanings, and it
is unclear which meaning Phillips and Goodman use
when they define common sense as "first- or second order
logical inferences that scientists should intuitively grasp":
(1) In the philosophical tradition of John Locke common
sense means input from different senses which has to be
integrated [4] so that, for instance, the vast majority of
researchers in a field share the same point of view.
(2) Thomas Reid [5] and G.E. Moore [6] introduced the
view that common sense beliefs are true.
In terms of meaning (1) above Hill's considerations have
not lead to common sense in the past. Just the opposite is
the case, and it appears unlikely that this situation will
change in the future because different researchers have dif-
ferent interests: Substantive researchers need to identify
new relations and frivolously label them "causal" to suc-
ceed (e.g. in funding, a point mentioned by Phillips and
Goodman), while methodologists need to scrutinise com-
mon malpractices (and many of them do not agree with
one another as well). Moreover, common sense changes
over time because knowledge changes as societies, politics
and other factors change that influence common sense.
Hence, common sense might be wrong at least at some
time.
On the other hand, in terms of meaning (2) above Hill's
considerations can lead to common sense only in the sim-
ple causal systems they apply to, as I have tried to demon-
strate [2].
Getting back on the right track
The roads on the way to sound causal decisions have
many branch connections, some of which have converged
and now lead in the same direction (e.g. Pearl [7] has
shown that counterfactual models, causal graphs and
some non-parametric structural equation models are
equivalent for all practical issues), and some of which lead
down blind alleys (e.g. some structural equation models
that failed to recur in experiments [8]). During the last
decades, however, the traffic has concentrated in the direc-
tion delineated by counterfactual causality. There are
important wherefores, especially in epidemiology, that
have been outlined elsewhere ([9] and references therein).
Therefore, I believe that, yes, counterfactual causality
should be used as the standard conception of causality. In
epidemiology, causal decisions are inevitable (despite the
Duhem-Quine problem mentioned by Phillips and
Goodman). Consider the example that one has to choose
between two available options for public health interven-
tion. How can one decide without referring, at least
implicitly, to a conception of causality? How can one
decide without referring to assumptions, data, and mod-
els on how the outcome would turn out when using one
option instead of the other (i.e., counterfactual causality)?
Therefore, I consider counterfactual causality to be com-
mon sense in the meaning of common sense as true
beliefs, and it is the direction along which one approaches
the target of optimal causal inference. As pointed out by
Rothman and Greenland [10], making causal decisions is
nothing more than an error-prone process (as is the case
when measuring a condition, a point discussed by Phillips
and Goodman). The aim is "simply" to minimize the
probabilities to draw false positive and false negative con-
clusions on the existence of a causal effect. More precisely,
this is a decision problem with the potential harm of each
possible error resulting in consequences for individuals'
health as well as for health costs.
Seemingly, and confirmed by Phillips and Goodman Hill
was already propelling his ideas in the counterfactual
direction but, unfortunately, he did not point that out
unambiguously. In Höfler [2], I have tried to demonstrate
that researchers applying his considerations often blindly
followed his heuristics rather than take care to maintain
the counterfactual direction toward which they shall
point. The problem is that Hill's heuristics do not work
well in every landscape, namely, a landscape representing
a particular causal system. This is exactly the gap that I
have attempted to fill.
For instance, Hill's consideration on strength of associa-
tion can be viewed in light of the heuristic always to walk
toward the steepest observable gradient when searching
for the highest peak in misty mountains. The probability
that this heuristic will fail rises with the number of peaks
in the mountains. If you know the direction, you might
lose it randomly (e.g., because your compass breaks), or
systematically because you make wrong assumptions on
how to maintain the right direction when walking around
hurdles such as hills or lakes (i.e., biases).Publish with BioMed Central    and   every 
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Phillips and Goodman distinguish between counterfactu-
als on the one hand and hypotheticals and ex ante hypoth-
eses on the other. This distinction appears artificial to me.
Suppose one asks: "If the data were free of all biases
(applying a particular bias model), how would the data be
expected to change?" This constitutes a counterfactual dif-
ference between the (presumably) true condition of cer-
tain biases of certain magnitudes being present versus the
counterfactual condition of no biases. Thus, the biases
have caused a change in the data – as compared to the
dataset that would emerge from a causal system free of
biases (besides the unlikely possibility that the biases can-
cel out exactly). Counterfactuals are always hypothetical.
Phillips and Goodman provide several other relevant
arguments that are not directly related to my paper. I share
most of their viewpoints including those on common
malpractices in data analysis, reporting of results and
funding. Scientific success (in terms of impact factors,
funding etc.) appears more likely if sharp conclusions
such as "We have demonstrated a previously unknown
effect..." are drawn rather than more careful ones, such as
"Given the data and a defendable model for biases the
probability of a causal effect of a magnitude of greater
than c is X...". As long as this undesirable state of affairs
remains the case, better practices are likely to remain in
Phillips and Goodman's words an "esoteric sideline" of
research.
Conclusion
Counterfactuals define the direction in which one has to
go to derive sound strategies to separate causal from non-
causal associations. Hill's considerations are not common
sense and do not lead us to common sense; they are
merely heuristics with which epidemiological researchers
may or may not find the right way to causal decisions with
minimal error probabilities. These heuristics easily fail in
complicated and poorly understood environments
(causal systems), but counterfactual causality tells us
which questions to pose when deciding whether to apply
them or not.
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